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ABSTRACT 
We prove some theorems which reconsider the completeness of Hoare's 
logic for the partial correctness of while-programs when equipped with a 
first-order assertion language. The results are about the expressiveness of 
the assertion language and the role of specifications in completeness con-
cerns for the logic: (1) expressiveness is not a necessary condition on a 
structure for its Hoare logic to be complete; (2) complete number theory is 
the only extension of Peano Arithmetic which yields a logically complete 
Hoare logic; (3) a computable structure with enumeration is expressive if, 
and only if, its Hoare logic is complete. 
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With the term Hoare's logic we mean the formal system for the manipula-
tion of statements about the partial correctness of while-programs which 
was first described in HOARE [10]. In this paper we shall be concerned with 
the mathematical structure of this logic when it is equipped with a first-
order assertion language L, and is set to analyse computation on essentially 
arithmetical structures by the members of the set of while-programs WP. We 
will prove some theorems about the relationship between the expressiveness 
of the assertion language, the specifications of the structures, and the 
completeness of the logic itself: theorems which are technical comments on 
the nature of the completeness of the formal system, but which also reflect 
on two informal attitudes to data abstraction available when working with 
Hoare's logic. 
The starting point for any mathematical study of Hoare's ideas is the 
seminal paper COOK [7] where the various syntactic and semantic components 
associated with the system were carefully examined, and the soundness of 
logic properly proved. Of particular interest to us is the role of the 
oracle or structural specification in Hoare's logic. This is a set O of 
assertions used in connection with the Rule of Consequence, and it is intend-
ed to formalise what information about data types is available to correctness 
proofs for the programs the data types support (cf. HOARE [10], Section 2). 
From [7], we know that if O sound for a structure A then Hoare's logic HL(O) 
is sound for WP over A, too. Up to the choice of program semantics for while-
programs, Cook's analysis of Hoare's ideas is general, faithful and defini-
tive. (For information on the issues involved in the choice of semantics 
consult GREIF & MEYER [9].) 
Of course, in [7], Cook also considered the completeness of Hoare's 
logic, but with apparently less satisfying theoretical results: under the 
hypotheses that O is a complete specification for structure A and that Lis 
expressive for WP over A then HL(O) is complete for WP over A. For example, 
if the standard arithmetic N of the natural numbers is specified by its 
first-order theory Th(N), called complete number theory, then its Hoare 
logic is complete for WP over N since Lis expressive for WP over N. 
Much theoretical effort has ·been expended in coming to terms with this 
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assumption of expressiveness and with the paucity of expressible structures; 
and, by extension, in evaluating the kind of completeness Cook was able to 
provide. The writing on this theme is quite extensive, but one can usefully 
consult the invaluable survey article APT [1] to obtain a clear picture of 
current opinion. In summary, the basic material about while-programs is 
contained in WAND [18] and our own [4] (on incompleteness); and in LIPTON 
[12] (on expressiveness). In the case of a richer programming formalism the 
situation is far more perplexing since expressiveness can fail to be a 
sufficient condition for the existence of any kind of complete Hoare logic: 
see CLARKE [6]; but there remains a common ground of complex languages with 
complete Hoare logics over expressive structures and this has been charted 
in LIPTON [12], LANGMAACK & OLDEROG [11], in the monograph DE BAKKER [2] 
and, again, in APT [1]. Let us concentrate on the simple facts of life for 
while-programs. 
Although expressiveness is not an unnatural condition from the point 
of view of computing on a structure, is it actually necessary for the 
completeness of the structure's Hoare logic? 
THEOREM 1. Expressiveness is not a necessary condition on a structure for 
the completeness of its Hoare logic. For any model A of complete number 
theory Hoare's logic is complete, but if A is not the standard model of 
arithmetic then Lis not expressive for WP over A. 
Now Theorem 1 illuminates a certain change of status for Hoare's logic 
in the passage from the Soundness Theorem to the Completeness Theorem; 
from a system of reasoning based purely upon a data type specification to 
a system of reasoning based upon a fixed data type which is appropriately 
specified. The alteration is effected by the kind of completeness sought 
for Hoare's logic: the set of valid asserted programs is defined by a single 
structure and not by the class of all models of a specification, as one 
expects to see in a "true" converse to the Soundness Theorem. The property 
of expressiveness certainly underlines this semantic emphasis, but express-
iveness does not determine it and from Theorem 1 one can deduce this other 
kind of completeness is possible for arithmetic: 
Let us say that a Hoare logic HL(O) is logically complete if any 
asserted program which is valid on all models of the specification O is 
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provable in HL(O). 
THEOREM 2. Complete number theory is the only extension T of Peano Arithmetic 
for which HL(T) is logically complete. 
There are two attitudes toward data abstraction to govern one's work 
with Hoare's logic: given that some specification is a necessary constituent 
of the proof system, one may think of the specification, and hence the logic, 
as an instrument to analyse computation on a particular structure; or one 
may think of the specification as an abstract characterisation of an ill-
defined class of legitimate implementations. Both ideas are commonplace in 
the literature on the semantics of data types, of course. 
From the point of view of computing on a given structure, the examples 
in Theorem 1 can hardly qualify as interesting data types in their own 
right; they are not computable for example: see [16]. (Nevertheless, non-
standard models of arithmetic are part and parcel of the concern for correct-
ness simply because, mathematically, a Hoare logic HL(O) is not a system of 
reasoning about one particular structure (say, N) but about the class of all 
models of the specification O (say, Th(N))). 
A close reading of Hoare's work in this area suggests that he intended 
his calculus to be a system of reasoning about programs running on any 
legal implementation of the specification. If we interpret a legal implemen-
tation of a specification Oas simply a computable model of O then we have 
a mathematically intermediate notion of completeness in which validity is 
based upon all computable models of 0. In the case of arithmetic this 
collapses to a particular structure where expressiveness and completeness 
occur together. As it turns out this is a general phenomenon and, in partic-
ular, we have further reassurance of the usefulness of Cook's study of 
completeness: 
THEOREM 3. Let A be an infinite computable structure. Then A can be augmen-
ted by a computable enumeration, consisting of a distinguished constant 
first and a unary injective operator next: A+ A such that A= {nextn(first): 
n E w}, to make a new structure A with the result that Lis expressive for 
e 
WP over A if, and only if, HL(A) is complete for A. 
e e 
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We have greatly prolonged this introduction to accommodate our obser-
vations on the semantic and syntactic roles of specifications; henceforth 
we deal with mathematical issues only. The first two sections concern the 
construction and basic properties of Hoare's logic while the next three 
sections technically discuss completeness and prove the theorems announced. 
Obviously, we are assuming the reader to be familiar with HOARE [10] and 
COOK [7], but little other knowledge is actually necessary. This paper is 
a close companion of our [4] about natural structures which possess no 
complete Hoare-like logics for their while-programs; and both papers are 
sequels to our [3] written with J. Tiuryn. 
1. PRELIMINARIES ON ASSERTIONS AND PROGRAMS 
In this and the next section we map out the technical prerequisites 
for the paper. In addition to the important sources HOARE [10], COOK [7], 
the reader would do well to consult the survey article APT [1]. 
The first-order language L = L(E) of some signature Eis based upon a 
set of variables x 1 ,x2 , ... and its constant, function and relational symbols 
are those of E together with the boolean constants true, false and the equal-
ity relation. We assume L possesses the usual logical connectives and quant-
ifiers; and the set of all algebraic terms of L we denote T(E). 
Using the syntax of L, the set WP= WP(E) of all while-programs over 
Eis defined in the customary way. 
For any structure A of signature E, the semantics of the first-order 
language Lover E as determined by A has its standard definition in model 
theory and this we assume to be understood. The validity of¢ EL over 
structure A we write A I= ¢. 
If O is a set of assertions of L then the set of all formal theorems 
of O is denoted Thm(O); we write O I- ¢for¢ E Thm(O). Such a set O of 
formulae is usually called a theory, but in the present context we prefer 
the more suggestive term specification. Two specifications 0,0• are 
logically equivalent if Thm(O) = Thm(O'). A specification O is complete 
if given any assertion ¢ E L, either O I- ¢ or O I- - ¢. The set Th (A) 
of all assertions true of a structure A is called the first-order theory 
of A; evidently Th(A) is a complete specification. The class of all models 
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0 is denoted Mod(O); we write Mod(O) f ~ to mean that for every A E Mod(T), 
A F ~. Godel' s Completeness Theorem says this about specifications: 
0 I- ~ if, any only if, Mod(O) f ~-
For a proper discussion of these concepts the reader should consult CHANG -
& KEISLER [5]. 
For the semantics of WP as determined by a structure A, we leave the 
reader free to choose any sensible account of while-program computations 
which applies to an arbitrary structure: COOK [7]; the graph-theoretic 
semantics in GREIBACH [8]; the denotational semantics described in DE 
BAKKER [2]. What constraints must be placed on this choice are the necessi-
ties of formulating and proving certain lemmas, such as Lemma 1.1, and of 
verifying the soundness of Hoare's logic (Theorem 2.2). These conditions 
will be evident from the text and, for such a simple programming formula 
as WP, can hardly be problematical. For definiteness, we have in mind a 
naive operational semantics based upon appropriate A-register machines which 
yield straightforward definitions of a state in a WP computation and of 
the length of a WP computation [17]. Thus, if SE WP involves n program 
n variables and computes on structure A then we use elements of A to repres-
n 
ent states in the computations of S. For a EA, the length of the computa-
tion S(a) is denoted ls(a) I. The proof of the following fact is a routine 
matter: 
1.1. LEMMA. Let S E WP involve variables x = (x1 , ... ,xn). Then for each 
l E w one can effectively find a formula COMPs,l(x,y) of L, wherein 
n 
y = (y1 , •.. ,yn) are new variables, such that for any A and any a,b EA, 
A f COMP s,l (a,b) if, and only if, the computation s (a) terminates in 
l or less steps leaving the variables with values b = (b1 , ••• ,bn). 
From the syntax Land WP, we make a new kind of syntactic object 
called the asserted program; this is a triple of the form {p}S{q} where 
p,q EL and SE WP and the variables of p,q and Sare the same. To the 
asserted programs we assign partial correctness semantics: the asserted 
program {p}S{q} is valid on a structure A (in symbols: A f {p}S{q}) if 
for each initial state a E An, A f p (a) implies either S (a) terminates and 
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A I= q(S(a)) or S(a) diverges. And the asserted program {p}S{q} is valid 
for a specification O if it is valid on every model of O; in symbols, 
0 f {p}S{q} or Mod(O) I= {p}S{q}. 
The partial correctness theory of a structure A is the set 
PC(A) = {{p}S{q}: Af {p}S{q}}; 
and the partial correctness theory of a specification O is the set 
PC(O) = {{p}S{q}: Mod(O) f {p}S{q}}. 
Clearly, 
PC ( 0) = n A E Mod ( 0) PC (A) • 
Finally, we define strongest postconditions. Let~ EL and SE WP, 
both having n variables. The strongest postcondition of Sand~ on a struc-
ture A is the set 
spA(~,S) = {b E An: 3a E An.[S(a) terminates in final state 
b and A I= ~(a)]} 
1.2 LEMMA. A f {p}S{q} <=> spA(p,S) c {b E An: A f q(b)}. 
2. HOARE'S LOGIC 
Hoare's logic for while-programs over I,_ with assertion language L 
and specification or oracle O c L, has the following axioms and proof rules 
for manipulating asserted programs: let s,s1 ,s2 E WP; p,q,p1 ,q1 ,r EL; 
b EL, a quantifier-free formula. 
1. Assignment axiom scheme: fort E T(I) and x a variable of L, the asserted 
program 
{p[t/x]}x := t{p} 
is an axiom, where p[t/x] stands for the result of substituting t for 
free occurrences of x in p. 
2. Composition rule: 
{p}s1{r},{r}s2{q} 
{q}Sl;S2{q} 
3. Conditional rule: 
4. Iteration rule: 
{pAb}S{p} 
{p} while b do Sod {pA7b} 
5. Consequence rule: 
p ➔ P1,{pl}S{ql}, ql + q 
{p}S{q} 
And, in connection with 5, 
6. Oracle axiom: Each member of Thm(O) is an axiom. 
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The set of asserted programs derivable from these axioms by the proof 
rules we denote HL(O); we write HL(O) t {p}S{q} in place of {p}S{q} E HL(O). 
2.1 BASIC UNIQUENESS LEMMA. For any consistent specifications O and O• which 
are logically equivalent we have that HL(O) =_HL(O') and PC(O) = PC(O 1 ). 
PROOF. The equality of Hoare logics over logically equivalent specifications 
is obvious. If Thm(O) = Thm(O 1 ) then Mod(O) = Mod(O 1 ), by the soundness of 
first-order logic. Therefore PC(O) = PC(O 1 ). 
The Corollary to Theorem 1 in COOK [7] says this: 
2.2 SOUNDNESS THEOREM. For any specification 0, HL(O) c PC(O). 
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The Hoare logic HL(O) is said to be logically complete if HL(O) = PC(O). 
As noted in the Introduction, Cook chose to consider the completeness of 
Hoare's logic relative to a fixed structure rather than its logical complete-
ness; we state Theorem 3 in [7]: 
The assertion language Lis expressive for WP over structure A if for 
every~ EL and every SE WP, the strongest post-condition sp (~,S) is 
A 
first-order definable over A. 
2.3 COOK'S COMPLETENESS THEOREM. For any structure A, if O is a complete 
specification for A in the sense that Thm(O) = Th(A), and if Lis expressive 
for WP over A, then HL(O) = PC(A). 
Hoare's logic for while-programs over a structure A is defined to be 
HL(Th(A)) and is denoted HL(A). From the Soundness Theorem 2.2, we know 
that 
HL(A) = HL(Th(A)) c PC(Th(A)) c PC(A) 
and the Completeness Theorem says that if Lis expressive for WP over A then 
HL(A) = PC(A). 
Let N = (w;O,x+l,x~l + ,x,~) to be standard model of arithmetic; the 
Corollary to Theorem 3 in [7] says: 
2.4 COROLLARY. HL(N) = PC(N). 
3. COMPUTING ON A STRUCTURE 
When using first-order logic to investi~ate properties of a given 
structure it must be kept in mind that the logical methods see the structure 
as an object unique up to elementary equivalence and not isomorphism. If 
A and Bare structures of common signature then A is elementary equivalent 
to B (in symbols: A= B) if Th(A) = Th(B). 
3.1 UNIQUENESS LEMMA FOR STRUCTURES. 
If A - B then HL(A) = HL(B) and PC(A) = PC(B). 
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PROOF. The equality of the Hoare logics over elementary equivalent structures 
follows from the Uniqueness Lemma 2.1, and is obvious anyway. Consider the 
second statement about correctness theories. 
Suppose A I= {p}S{q} where p,q E L, and S E WP involves n program 
variables. Given Sand l E w one can effectively find a while-program Sl 
which applied to any input state of any I-structure A computes exactly as 
S computes for l steps and then diverges if S has not terminated in that 
n 
time. Thus, for a EA, 
{S(a) 
undefined 
if ls<a~ :;; l 
otherwise. 
It is easy to prove from Lemma 1.1 the following fact: 
3.2 LEMMA. For any assertion~ of Lone can effectively find a first-order 
formula SP(~,Sl) which for every I-structure A defines the strongest post-
condition spA(~,Sl). 
Now define SP(~,S) :VlEwSP(~,Sl), an infinitary formula which uniformly 
defines the strongest postcondition of~ and S. We calculate as follows: 
A F {p}S{q} <=> A F SP (p,S) -+ q by Lemma 1.2 
<=> A r= cVlEw sP<p,st>J + q 
<=> A r=/\lE/SP(p,Sl) -+ q] 
<=> for every l € w, A r= SP(p,Sl) -+ q 
<=> for every l € w, B F SP (p,Sl) -+ q since A - B 
<=> B F/\tEiSP(p,Sl) -+ q] 
<=> B I= {p}S{q}. 
Q.E.D. 
3.3 COROLLARY. If HL(A) is complete and A= B then HL(B) is complete. 
PROOF. Assume HL(A) = PC(A). By Lennna 3.1, HL(A) = HL(B) and PC(A) = PC(B) 
so HL(B) = PC(B). Q.E.D. 
Here is the first theorem of the Introduction. 
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3.4 THEOREM. For every model A of complete number theory Th(N), HL(A) is 
complete; but if A is non-standard then Lis not expressive for WP over A. 
PROOF. Any model A of complete number theory is elementary equivalent to the 
standard model N; thus, HL(A) is complete by Corollary 3.3 and Corollary 
2.4. We show Lis not expressive for A. 
Let S be the following arithmetic program, 
x:=y; while x ~ 0 do x:=x~l od; x:=y. 
On the structure A, S attempts to count down from the value of y to O: given 
initial state (a,b) E A2 if S terminates then its final state is (b,b) and 
bis a standard number in A; if bis non-standard then S diverges from 
initial state (a,b) for any .a EA. 
Consider the set sp (true,S). Inspecting its definition we find that 
2 A--
for (a,b) EA, 
(a,b) E spA(true,S) <=>a= band a is standard. 
Thus, X = {a EA: (a,a) Esp (true,S)} is precisely the set of all standard 
A--
numbers in A. If spA(true,S) were first-order definable then, from the axioms 
of Peano Arithmetic, we could prove the existence of a least element of 
7 X. But A has no smallest non-standard element because each non-zero element 
has a predecessor. Q.E.D. 
4. COMPUTING WITH A SPECIFICATION 
Let us begin by establishing a general connection between the logical 
completeness of Hoare's logic based upon a specification and the completeness 
of the logic as it is determined by a particular structure. 
4.1 THEOREM. Let O be a consistent specification which is complete. Then for 
each A E Mod(O) it is the case that HL(O) = HL(A) and PC(O) = PC(A). In 
particular, the following three statements are equivalent: 
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1. HL(O) = PC(O). 
2. For each A E Mod(O), HL(A) = PC(A). 
3. For some A E Mod(O), HL(A) = PC(A). 
PROOF. If A E Mod(O) then Thm(O) = Th(A) because O is complete. On inspecting 
the appropriate definitions one sees that HL(O) = HL(A). Consider the correct-
ness theories. The completenss of O implies PC(O) = PC(Th(A)) and we must 
show that PC(Th(A)) = PC(A). Now, 
Since all models of Th(A) are elementary equivalent to A, the Uniqueness 
Lemma 3.1 reduces the intersection to PC(Th(A)) = PC(A). 
The equivalence in the theorem are easy corollaries of the first 
conclusions. Q.E.D. 
From Cook's Completeness Theorem 2.3 we can deduce this next theorem. 
4.2 THEOREM. Let O be a consistent specification which is complete. Then if 
Mod(O) contains an element A for which Lis expressive for WP over A then 
HL(O) is logically complete. 
Here is the second theorem stated in the Introduction. 
4.3 THEOREM. Complete number theory Th(N) is the only extension T of Peano 
arithmetic for which HL(T) is logically complete. 
PROOF. Hoare's logic based on complete number theory is logically complete 
by Theorem 4.1 and Corollary 2.4. We prove that for any extension T of 
Peano Arithmetic, if HL(T) is complete for Mod(T) then T satisfies the 
following w-Rule: let~ be any formula of Land let n denote the numeral in 
L corresponding ton E w. 
T I- ~ (E._) for each n E w 
T I- 'v'x~ (x) 
With this (ti-Rule it is a routine matter to show that Thm (T) = Th (N) • First, 
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one proves that Th(N) c Thm(T) by induction on the complexity of formulae 
and using thew-Rule. This done, the equality Th(N) = Thm(T) follows 
immediately from the completeness of Th(N). 
Let us prove the w-Rule. Let </> be a formula and suppose T I- </> (~) for 
all n E w. Let S denote the following program 
y::= O; while x -I- y do y:= y+l od 
and consider the asserted program 
h q,(x)}S{false} 
First, we claim that Mod (T) I= { 7 </> (x) }s{ false}. For if M E Mod (T) , 
m EM and MI= 7 <f,(m) then mis a non-standard element of M because we are 
assuming</> provable on all the standard numbers. Thus, the precondition 
7 q,(x) guarantees that the program diverges and so the asserted program 
is valid. 
Since HL(T) is complete for Mod(T) we know that 
HL(T) I- h <f,(x) }S{false}. 
We now unpick a formal proof of the asserted program in HL(T) and from its 
intermediate assertions put together a proof for TI- Vx.q,(x). Starting 
from the conclusion of the Hoare logic proof we step backward 3 times 
always seeking theorems of T. 
STEP I. By the Composition Rule, there must be a formula o = o(x,y) con-
taining free variables x,y, but also other unnamed variables, such that 
(a) HL(T) I- h <f,(x)} y:= 0 {o (x,y)} 
(b) HL(T) I- {o(x,y)} while x -I- y do y:= y+l od {false} 
Clearly, (a) implies that 
(c) TI- 7 q,(x) A y = 0 ➔ o(x,O). 
STEP II. Consider I(b). By the while-Rule and the Rule of Consequence, an 
intermediate assertion 0 = 0(x,y) must exist to satisfy 
(a) T I- o -+ 0 
(b) HL(T) I- {0 A x =/- y} y := y+l{0} 
(c) T I- 0 A x = y -+ false 
And this latter statement we rewrite 
(d) T I- 0 -+ x =/- y. 
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STEP III. Consider II(b). This statement is derived via the Rule of Conse-
quence from an appeal to an assignment axiom: there exists y = y(x,y) such 
that 
(a) T I- 0 A x =/- y-+ y[y/y+l] 
(b) HL(T) I- {y[y/y+l]} y:= y+l{y} 
(c) T I- y -+ 0 
Now we can show that T I- Vx. cf> (x). This involves a little logical 
calculation with the 6 formal theorems of T which we organize around the 
following lemma 
4.4 LEMMA. T I- -, cf>(x) -+ Vy.0(x,y) A x =I- y. 
Given this lemma, the remainder of the proof is simply a formal deduction: 
T I- .., cf>(x) -+ [Vy.0(x,y) A x =/= y] 
T I- [Vy.0(x,y) A x =/= y] -+ Vy.x =/= y 
T I- [Vy.x =/= y] -+ false 
By transitivity of implication, 
T I- 7 <I> (x) -+ false 
T I- cf> (x) 
this is Lemma 4.4; 
Reinstating the universal quantifier we have Tr Vx.cf>(x). 
PROOF OF LEMMA 4.4. We use the axiom scheme of induction belonging to 
Peano Arithmetic and which is available for T. It is enough to derive a 
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basis theorem and an induction step theorem 
Basis: T I- -r <I> (x) + [0 (x,O) /\ X -:/- .Q_] 
T I- 7 <I> (x) + o (x,.Q_) from I (c) ; 
T I- o(x,O) + 0(x,O) from II (a) ; 
T I- -r cp (x) + 0(x,O) by transitivity. 
T I- 7 <I> (x) + X -:/- 2. since T I- <I> (.Q_) • 
Whence the basis theorem is obtained by conjoining these last two statements. 
Induction step: T I- [0 (x,y) /\ X -:/- y] + [0(x,y+1) /\ x -:/- y+l] 
T I- [0 (x,y) /\ x-:/- y] + y(x,y+l) this is III (a) ; 
T I- y(x,y+l) + 0(x,y+1) from III (c) ; 
T ~ [0 (x,y) /\ X-:/- y] + 0(x,y+1) by transitivity. 
T I- 0(x,y+1) + x-:/- y+l from II(d). 
Whence the induction theorem is obtained from these last two statements. 
Q.E.D. 
5. EXPRESSIBILITY AND COMPLETENESS FOR COMPUTABLE STRUCTURES 
If Hoare's intentions are not quite faithfully represented by the 
mathematics of Sections 3 and 4 then at least it adequately supports the 
suggestion, made in the Introduction, of defining a third kind of complete-
ness from the class of computable models of a specification. Let CPC(O) be 
the set of all asserted programs valid on all computable models of 0. Then 
Theorem 4.1 allows us to reduce completeness considerations of HL(O) with 
respect to CPC(O) to the case of an individual structure: if O is complete 
and possesses a computable model then for any A E Mod(O), PC(A) = CPC(O) = 
PC(O). So it is, we are led, to take an interest in Hoare's logic over 
particular computable structures. 
By an enumeration for a structure A we mean a distinguished element 
. n 
first of A and an injective operator next: A+ A such that A={~ (first): 
n E w}. By a structure with enumeration we mean a structure with such an 
enumeration named in its signature. In this last section we will prove 
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this theorem. 
5.1 THEOREM. Each infinite computable structure possesses a computable enum-
eration. If A is a computable structure with enumeration then Lis expressive 
for WP over A if, and only if, HL(A) = PC(A). 
Finite structures are computable, of course, and as Lis always express-
ive for them their Hoare logics are always complete. Presburger Arithmetic 
is the simplest computable structure with enumeration; Lis not expressive 
for it and its Hoare logic is incomplete. For the standard model of arithme-
tic N, the ring of integers, and the field of rational numbers, Lis 
expressive and Hoare's logic is complete. But for the fields of real alge-
braic numbers and algebraic numbers, Lis again not expressive and Hoare's 
logic is incomplete, [4]. 
Of course, before proving Theorem 5.1 we are obliged to say something 
about computable structures. Our definition is the standard formal definition 
of the concept of a computable structure and it derives from RABIN [15] and 
MAL'CEV [13]. 
A structure A is computable if there exists a recursive subset Q of the 
set of natural numbers wand a surjection a:S}+A such that (1) the relation 
= defined on Q by n= m ~ an = am in A is recursive; and ( 2) for each k-ary a a 
operation a and each k-ary relation R of A there exist recursive functions 
a and R which commute the following diagrams 
wherein ak(x1 , ••• ,xk) = (ax1 , ••• ,axk) and R is identified with its character-
istic function. 
Let A be a computable structure with coding a. A set Sc An is said to 
be (a-)computable or (a-)semicomputable accordingly as 
is recursive or r.e. 
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5.2 LEMMA. Every infinite computable structure A is isomorphic to a recur-
sive number al.gebra R whose domain is the set of natural numbers wand in 
which the r.e. subsets of w correspond with the semicomputable subsets of 
A. The zero and successor on w induce a computable enumeration of A; more-
over, if A is a computable structure with enumeration then the isomorphism 
and algebra R can be chosen so as to allow zero and successor on w to 
correspond to the given enumeration of A. 
The lemma is not difficult to formally prove; the reader may care to 
consult MAL'CEV [13]. 
PROOF OF THEOREM 5.1. One implication is Cook's Completeness Theorem 2.3. 
Let A be a computable structure with enumeration and assume HL(A) is complete; 
we show that for¢ EL and SE WP, the strongest postcondition spA(¢,S) 
is first-order definable over A. Let¢ and S involve n variables and define 
GRAPHA(S) S(a) terminates in final state b}. 
Then 
and so it is :sufficient to prove that GRAPHA(S) is first-order definable. 
The following lemma we leave as an exercise: 
5.3 LEMMA. For any computable structure A and any SE WP, the set GRAPHA(S) 
is semicomputable. 
Whence the theorem follows from this proposition. 
5.4 PROPOSITION. Let A be an algebraic with enumeration having signature E. 
n 
Assume A is computable and that HL(A) is complete for WP over A. If X c A 
is semicomputabl~ then Xis first-order definable over E. 
PROOF. By the normalising Lemma 5.2 we can assume A to be isomorphic to a 
recursive nurr~er algebra R with domain wand whose enumeration is given 
by first element O and~ operator, succ(x) = x+l. Moreover, the semi-
computability of X can be identified with the recursive enumerability of 
17 
-1 
a X where a:R + A is the isomorphism. Thus, technically, the matter reduces 
to proving that any recursively enumerable set Y c wn is first-order over the 
signature E in any numerical structure R which is a recursive expansion of 
Presburger Arithmetic P = (w;O,succ) and for which HL(R) is complete for 
WP over R. 
V 
By Matijacevic's Diophantine Theorem [14], it is clear that it is 
sufficient to prove that ordinary addition and multiplication on w is first-
order over E. Using the completeness of HL(R) for WP over R we shall show 
that 
plus= {(x,y,z) 3 E W x+y = z} 
is first-order over E; we carry out the argument in detail and leave the 
case of 
mult = {(x,y,z) 
as an exercise. 
3 
E W XX y = z} 
Consider the following composite program S - s 1 ;s2 E WP having variables 
x,y,z1,z2 ,u and defined by these programs 
s1 - zl := x; u := O; 
while u '/: y do u := succ(u); zl := succ(z1) od; 
u := O; z2 := 0 
s2 - z2 := x; u := O; 
while u '/: y do u := succ(u); z2 := succ(z2) .2£.i -
Both programs add the values of x and y; but program s 1 tidies up the values 
of its auxiliary variables so that from state (a,b,c,d,e) it computes and 
terminates in state (a,b,a+b,O,O). 
Clearly, R I= {true}S{z1=z2 } and by the completeness of HL(R) we know 
that 
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By the Composition Rule, there must exist a first-order intermediate 
assertion o such that 
HL(R) I- {true}S1 {o} 
and so, by thE~ Soundness Theorem, 
Given the form of the final states of s1 we know that 
for all a,b E w , R F o (a,b,a+b,O,O) 
and, thereforie, that 
(a,b,c) E plus ==> R f o (a,b,c,O,O) 
Contrapositively assume (a,b,c) i plus. Then a+ b # c implies that for any 
initial state (a,b,c,d,e) the program s2 will terminate but R fl z 1 = z 2 . 
The validity of the asserted program {o}s2{z 1=z2 } immediately implies 
(a,b,c) i plus ==> R f , o (a,b,c,O,O) 
and that plus is first order. Q.E.D. 
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